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Abstract
We evaluate the effects of capital controls and macro-prudential policies in small open
economies with a housing sector that is open to foreign ownership. The work is motivated by
concerns that foreign investments also respond to housing investment opportunities result-
ing in potential house price inflation and issues about housing affordability. Our dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model features housing as an internationally traded invest-
ment. We also consider macro-prudential policies that are combinations of monetary and
fiscal instruments. We investigate whether foreign investments in the housing markets are
de-stabilising and whether there are appropriate policy responses to mitigate the negative
effects of foreign direct investments in housing. Our simulations suggest: 1) foreign invest-
ments in domestic housing are in general welfare-improving and do not de-stabilise house
price inflation, 2) coordination between interest rate and time-varying instruments enhances
social welfare and is consistent with economic stabilisation, and 3) an active stamp duty on
foreign buyers helps to mitigate the welfare loss of savers through a redistribution of the tax
revenue received.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, housing has increasingly become a “tradable” asset. This is because of im-
provements in the transfer of funds across borders as well as the growing interest of investors in
buying residential properties in metropolitan cities around the world. These cities, also known
as global cities, have high population density, but scarce residential properties. This has led to
expectations of high returns from real estate, making residential properties attractive as assets
to hold in the portfolios of international investors.1
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in housing presents challenges for policy makers. It is
usually a welcomed stimulus for the local economy, as the foreign demand generates new con-
struction activity, leading to more employment opportunities and higher income. However,
while appreciating house prices generate wealth for residents, momentum effects may cause
expectation-driven boom–bust housing cycles that de-link prices from economic fundamentals.
The possibility of such de-stabilising speculative capital flows has become especially relevant
since the onset of the global financial crisis, when investors in advanced economies, searching
for higher returns, shifted their preferences towards emerging market economies and away from
low interest-rate environments in advanced economies. These de-stabilising influences2 can also
exacerbate the problem of housing affordability (e.g. Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2017).
Policymakers have resorted to a number of measures, such as increased stamp duties for foreign
buyers (Figure 1).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate a range of policy options in small open economies that
attract FDI in domestic housing, but where macro-prudential policies are designed nationally.
To this end, we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for a small
open economy that includes the buying/selling of domestic housing by foreigners. The model
allows us to examine more closely how FDI in the housing market alters the dynamics of the
economy in response to various shocks. Anticipating the results, our simulations show that FDI
in housing crowds out domestic housing investments, does not cause instability in house price
inflation, but can increase volatility in aggregate consumption and in the interest rate.
The model also allows us to investigate whether a range of suggested policy options are
welfare-enhancing and/or stabilising/de-stabilising. Specifically, we evaluate five policy regimes
for small open economies subject to FDI in housing. These policy regimes involve combinations
of policy instruments such as the monetary policy instrument (the interest rate), the macro-
prudential loan-to-value (LTV) ratio cap, and fiscal rules (stamp duties) that respond to housing
market conditions in a counter-cyclical manner.
Our policy simulations are also conducted for cases when the price target includes/excludes
asset (i.e. house) prices, as there are compelling reasons for policy makers to consider house
prices. Instability in the housing market may spill over to the macroeconomy (see Iacoviello
and Neri (2010)), and in general, unstable house prices create difficulty for the conduct of
1In the decade after the global financial crisis, there was a surge in outbound direct investment (ODI) from
China, especially into real-estate sectors around the world.
2Using data from seven small open economies, Ng and Feng (2016) estimated that foreign housing preferences
accounted for a large proportion of real house price volatility.
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monetary policy, especially for central banks practising inflation targeting. Housing is also a
main component of the consumer price index (CPI),3 and housing affordability is associated
with the welfare of the local residents (especially prominent in retirement plans).
Our work contributes to three strands in the literature. First, we add to the literature on
capital flows and housing markets. There have been ongoing discussions on the association
between current account and house prices (e.g. Matsuyama, 1990; Aizenman and Jinjarak,
2009; Ferrero, 2015), but with housing treated as a non-traded good. While it is true that
houses are not physically movable across borders like consumption goods, transactions of house
ownership titles between domestic and foreign entities are akin to trade in goods. Thus, subject
to acknowledging the physical location of the property, the international accumulation of housing
assets resembles that of an internationally traded durable good (Monacelli, 2009; Sterk, 2010;
Engel and Wang, 2011). Our model allows foreigners to directly acquire housing from domestic
property developers in an analogous way to international trade in consumption goods. This is
preferable to a generic assumption that foreign capital flows are purely international borrowing
(see Punzi, 2013; Mendicino and Punzi, 2014).
Second, following the literature on international portfolio investments (e.g. Devereux and
Sutherland, 2007), we model FDI as part of the foreigners’ investment portfolio. Existing models
of a small open economy with a housing market usually model the demand by foreigners for
domestic housing as exogenously determined or as a function of relative house prices between
domestic and foreign markets (see Funke and Paetz, 2013, 2016; Ng and Feng, 2016). We treat
housing as a portfolio asset and hence model the FDI as a function of the relative returns
between domestic housing and the foreign riskless asset. Our model allows us to identify the
effects of FDI more specifically.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the coordination of policies. In particular, while
there have been studies about imposing capital controls to restrict cross-border transactions
that discriminate against residency (Forbes et al., 2015), there have been no studies about
targeting international flows relating to housing transactions. This is despite evidence that
global cities in the world favour imposing stamp duties on foreign buyers. In our paper, we
investigate the coordination between macro-prudential policies and capital controls (e.g. Kuttner
and Shim, 2016; Zhang and Zoli, 2016; Korinek and Sandri, 2016; Ben Zeev, 2017; Korinek, 2018)
as well as the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies (e.g. Davig and Leeper, 2011;
Jarociński and Maćkowiak, 2018; Michaud and Rothert, 2018). Specifically, we consider policies
that target the housing market along with some degree of capital control. These policies include
stamp duties (including one exclusively on foreigners) and a ban on FDI in housing. Both are
rarely discussed in the literature, except in Chao and Yu (2015).
Anticipating the results, we show that a coordinated approach to using the instruments
of policies, specifically, the coordination between the monetary policy interest rate and other
time-varying instruments (the LTV ratio cap and stamp duty rules), enhances the welfare of
the economy. We also find that FDI and optimal policy regimes, in general, make savers worse
3In Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, and Canada, housing (excluding utilities) carries a weight of 22.87%,
34.29%, 22.3%, and 22.23%, respectively. Source: CEIC Database, December 2016.
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off, but the losses can be mitigated by an active stamp duty rule on foreign buyers. This is
because of the redistribution of wealth from foreign buyers to domestic residents, which increases
consumption and investment domestically.
The redistributional effects of the macro-prudential policies are particularly interesting.
While all the policy regimes investigated improve welfare for society, the improvements, in
general, favour borrowers, not savers. Recognising this non-Pareto outcome, we conducted
various sensitivity analyses to ascertain whether it is possible to mitigate welfare losses for savers
and/or borrowers. We find that although a Pareto improvement may be achieved in which both
savers and borrowers gain, the welfare outcome for society as a whole is only marginally better
than in the usual monetary regime with only a Taylor rule.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the DSGE model for a housing
market with foreigners. Section 3 describes the model dynamics and the effects of FDI. Section
4 compares the welfare effects across optimal policy regimes. Section 5 assesses the stabilising
effects of the regimes. The final section concludes.
2 Model with foreign investment in housing
The model features heterogeneous households (specifically, patient households, who are savers,
and impatient households, who are borrowers) subject to the extra feature that foreigners can
also buy/sell domestic housing. Figure 2 depicts the flows of funds in the model. The patient
and impatient households are denoted by s and b, respectively, with the propensity to save being
higher for the patient household than the impatient one, i.e. βs > βb. The impatient household
borrows funds from the patient household to finance its consumption and investments, subject
to a limit governed by the maximum LTV ratio ι and a nominal interest rate R set by the
central bank. Patient households have access also to foreign funds at the foreign interest rate
R∗; impatient households borrow only domestically. Both types of domestic household buy
consumption goods and accumulate housing. Foreigners buy consumption goods (exports) and
supply intermediate goods (imports), lend in the form of bonds to patient households, and
buy/sell domestic housing.
The production sectors are owned by the patient household. Both the goods-producing firm
and the housing developer pay for labour of the households in addition to paying for sector-
specific inputs of production. The goods-producing firm purchases intermediate materials from
foreigners for the production of consumption goods, while the housing developer purchases land
from the government for construction of new houses. Profits from selling the goods and houses
are transferred to the patient household as a source of income.
Policy makers intervene in the markets via both monetary and fiscal tools. The monetary
authority sets the maximum LTV ratio and the nominal interest rate, while the fiscal authority
sets the tax rates imposed on domestic households and foreigners at gross rates τ and τ∗,
respectively. The government sector is assumed to run a balanced budget as tax receipts and
revenue from land sales to the housing developer are transferred back to the household sector.
A novel feature of our model is that foreigners’ demand for housing is not exogenous as in
4
the existing literature, e.g. Funke and Paetz (2013). Foreigners’ decision to buy/sell housing
investments depends on the relative expected return between housing investments and riskless
investments in the foreign country, net of transaction taxes and depreciation of the housing
stock. This specification is in line with the literature on international portfolio investment,
such as Devereux and Sutherland (2007). With this setup, policy interventions in the housing
market affect foreigners’ demand for housing, but the extent depends on the demand elasticity
of foreigners. The details of the model are described next.
2.1 Foreign sector
As in Gaĺı and Monacelli (2005), foreigners are assumed to live in a large economy. Trade flows
are defined by exports of domestic goods to foreigners and by imports of intermediate goods
from foreigners. Capital flows include lending to patient households as well as flows associated
with the buying/selling of houses by foreigners. In what follows, variables of the foreign sector
are denoted by asterisks.
2.1.1 Goods and housing demand
Foreigners’ demand for goods exported from the home country is standard in small open-
economy models. See, for example, Justiniano and Preston (2010a,b), Monacelli (2005), and






Y ∗t , (1)
where P ∗c,t is the price of consumption goods in the domestic, denominated in foreign currency,
P ∗t is the price level in the foreign country, θ
∗
c > 0 is the elasticity of substitution.
Foreigners’ decision to invest in housing is driven by the expected return to the investment,
which includes changes in price (as in Adolfson et al. (2007)). We define foreigners’ demand










where R∗h,t is the return to housing investment, denominated in foreign currency, R
∗
t is the
riskless interest rate in the foreign country, and θ∗ > 0 measures the response of foreign housing
demand to the differential in returns. In the special case of θ∗h = 0, the foreigner does not
invest in the domestic housing market. Whereas, when θ∗h > 0, the foreigner invests more in
domestic housing when the return is above the steady state and/or when foreign riskless return
drops. This setup facilitates the assessment of the effect of total capital control. Housing stock
is accumulated as follows:
h∗s,t = (1− δ)h∗s,t−1 + I∗s,t, (3)
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where h∗t is the holding of housing stock by foreigners.
2.1.2 Return to housing investment
Foreigners are assumed to accumulate housing assets in the domestic economy as part of their
investment portfolio. Housing is seen as an alternative investment to bonds in the foreign
country. Thus, the expected foreign-currency-denominated return to houses purchased in the
current period is a function of the expected change in the relative house price, taking into
account exchange-rate movements and macro-prudential measures:




More precisely, the components are as follows:
• δ > 0 is the depreciation rate of housing. A higher depreciation rate reduces the return
to housing investment.
• We assume that in the steady state, R̄∗h = β∗−1, where β∗ is the discount factor of
foreigners. It follows that the coefficient χ = β∗−1 (1− δ)−1. The steady-state return
to housing investment is equal to that of the riskless return of foreign bonds, implying
foreigners’ indifference between the two investment choices in the steady state.
• τ∗t is the macro-prudential fiscal measure imposed as a gross tax/subsidy rate on purchases
of houses. When τ∗t > 0, it is also known as the buyers’ stamp duty; τ
∗
t is set to be above
unity when a stamp duty is imposed on buyers of the houses and below unity when a
subsidy is provided to the buyers. In the former case, the return to housing investment is
reduced.
• The nominal exchange rate et is defined as the price of foreign currency per unit of
domestic currency, so an increase in the value of et represents an appreciation of the
foreign currency. An expected appreciation of the foreign currency also renders investment
in domestic housing by foreigners less attractive.
2.2 Domestic households
A representative patient or impatient household derives utility from consumption goods, ci,t,
and the accumulation of housing assets, hi,t. It also derives dis-utility from supplying labour to





where the period utility is a function of the following form:





Here, i = s, b denotes the type of household, zh,t is the preference shocks to housing, κi is the
weight of housing in the utility function, and ηi is the elasticity of hours worked. Accordingly,














Since housing is a durable good, it depreciates at a rate δ and incurs an adjustment cost. The
accumulation equation and cost functions are










The expenditures of patient households include purchases of consumption goods, cs,t, and hous-
ing, hs,t, at prices Pc,t and Ph,t, respectively. The sources of income include wages at Wt per
hour worked, profits from the firms they own, Divt, and transfers from the government, Gt.
They also acquire bonds from abroad, b∗t , and pay interest on the previous period’s holding of
foreign bonds. Furthermore, since patient households have a higher propensity to save, they
also contribute to the supply of funds in the domestic loan market. Taken together, the budget









Here, τt is the buyers’ stamp duty and the sellers’ stamp duty, respectively. To prevent unlimited
borrowing from abroad, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and model the risk premium,















where ϕ is the risk premium elasticity.
The patient household maximises its utility, represented by Eq. (6), subject to the budget
constraint, represented by Eq. (12), by choosing the values of the variables cs,t, hs,t, ns,t, bs,t,
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and b∗s,t. The first-order conditions are














λs,tWt = Un,s,t (16)





where λs,t is the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint, interpreted as the increase in
utility for every unit increase in the household budget.
Equation (14) equates the marginal utility of consumption goods to that of the household
budget at the consumption-good price. Equation (15) shows that the marginal utility of the
household budget, valued at the current house price, is the sum of the marginal utility of housing
and that of the household budget valued at the expected future price of housing. From Eq. (16),
the dis-utility of labour supply is equal to the utility value of the nominal wage. Equation (17)
represents the Euler equation for the optimal loan provision in the domestic market, and Eq. (18)
represents one for optimal foreign bond holding.
2.2.2 Impatient household
Following Funke and Paetz (2013, 2016) and Mendicino and Punzi (2014), we assume that
impatient households do not have access to foreign bonds. They finance their consumption
and investments via wage income and borrowing from patient households. Accordingly, the
impatient household faces the following budget constraint:
Pc,tcb,t + τtPh,tIb,t + Ph,tγb,t +Rt−1bt−1 = Wtnb,t + bt +Gb,t (19)
In addition, its maximum borrowing bb,t is given by the expected present value of its home





As such, the impatient household maximises its utility, subject to two constraints: the budget
constraint represented by Eq. (19) and the borrowing constraint represented by Eq. (20). The
8
choice variables are cb,t, hb,t, bb,t, and nb,t. The first-order conditions are

















λb,tWt = Un,b,t (23)
λb,t = βbEtλb,t+1Rt + ψb,t, (24)
where λb,t and ψb,t are the Lagrange multipliers for the budget and borrowing constraints,
respectively, interpreted as the marginal utilities of household budget and borrowing.
2.3 Firms
There are two production sectors in the model, the consumption-good production sector (c)
and the housing development sector (h), both owned by patient households. The representative
firm in each sector utilises labour supplied by domestic households and a sector-specific input
for production. The outputs are sold to both domestic and foreign households.






where Nj,t is the labour input and Fj,t is the non-labour input of production. Specifically, in the
consumption-good firm, Fc,t is the imported intermediate good, Kt, while in the housing sector,
Fh,t is land, Lt. In the equation, At is the common productivity factor across the two sectors,
and µj is the share of non-labour inputs of production. The economy’s GDP is calculated as
the aggregate value outputs from both sectors:
PtYt = Ph,tYh,t + Pc,tYc,t. (26)
The profit maximisation problem for the firms is given by





where Pf,j,t is the corresponding factor price. The goods-producing firm imports materials at a
given import price P ∗m,t; the housing developer “buys” land at a government-determined price
Pl,t:
Pf,c,t = Pm,t = etP
∗
m,t (28)
Pf,h,t = Pl,t, (29)
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where P ∗m,t and Pl,t are assumed to be exogenously determined.
Since the focus is on consumption and housing, we shall assume, without loss of generality,
perfect mobility of labour and, hence, one nominal wage, Wt. Maximising profit, the firm







The housing sector is assumed to be without nominal rigidities. The housing developer sets the










Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we introduce price rigidity in the consumption-good sector.
In each period, there is a probability 1−ξ that it optimises the price. We then have the following
Phillips curve for the goods-producing firm:
log πc,t = βs log πc,t+1 +







where mct denotes the real marginal cost of consumption-good production. The nominal











The government is responsible for selling land to housing developers, collecting taxes from
housing transactions, and transferring all revenue equally to savers and borrowers:








The goods and housing markets clear when production meets their respective demands. In the
consumption-good market, the output of consumption goods equals the demand from domestic
households and foreigners. Similarly, in the housing market, new housing developments in the
present period equal new housing investments from domestic households and foreigners. The
market clearing conditions are given as
Yc,t = cs,t + cb,t + c
∗
t (35)
Yh,t − γs,t − γb,t = Is,t + Ib,t + I∗h,t. (36)
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The clearing of the labour market is achieved by assuming homogeneous labour and perfect
mobility of labour between sectors. With one nominal wage Wt, the labour market clears when
Nc,t +Nh,t = ns,t + nb,t. (37)
Combining the budget constraints of households, firms, and the government yields the bal-









m,tFc,t − Pc,tc∗t − τ∗t Ph,tI∗t . (38)
2.6 Monetary policy













where the coefficients φR,π and φR,g are the responses of interest rate to CPI inflation and GDP
growth, respectively.
2.7 Exogenous shocks
The exogenous variables, yt = {At, zh,t, R∗t , Y ∗t }, are assumed to follow autoregressive processes






We use positive shocks in productivity, housing preferences, and foreign demand, and an expan-
sionary foreign interest-rate shock, to simulate scenarios in which house price inflation increases.
2.8 Parameterisation
Without any specific economy in mind, we set the parameter values to be in the common
ranges seen in the literature. These parameter values are summarised in Table 1. Most of
the parameters follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) except the following. The housing preference
parameters, κs and κb, are calibrated to be 0.5, such that the steady-state housing output is
about 20% of the GDP. This is true for small open economies in which the housing sectors are
more attractive to foreign investors, for example, Hong Kong and Singapore. The elasticity of
demand in housing by foreigners is set to a lower value at 0.5 as compared to the foreign goods
demand at 3.0. We also assume that in steady state, no stamp duty is imposed, and the LTV
ratio cap is 0.85.
We assume some interactions among the shocks. Standard deviations of the shocks are set
to be 0.005, 0.05, 0.000625, and 0.05 for productivity, housing preference, foreign interest rate,
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and foreign demand, respectively. To reflect the association between the exogenous shocks, we
assume the correlation between the foreign shocks to be 0.5 and that between the domestic
housing preference and the foreign demand to be 0.2.
3 Model dynamics with a tradable housing sector
Our concern is whether FDI in housing exacerbates the volatility in house price inflation and,
consequently, real activity and CPI inflation. To understand the effect of FDI, we compare the
case where there is no FDI with the case where there is limited participation in the domestic
housing market by foreigners.
Holding all other parameters at their calibrated values, we simulate the former case by
setting the parameter θ∗h to 0. According to Eq. (2), FDI in the housing market is 0 and is
invariant. We then increase the value of θ∗h to 0.5 to mimic the case where FDI is time-varying,
with the relative movements between housing investment return R∗h,t and foreign riskless return
R∗t . This value of θ
∗
h delivers a standard deviation of housing stock held by foreign entities that
equals 3% of the GDP.4
In these comparative simulations, monetary policy is set at its simplest form, excluding any
macro-prudential considerations. The simulations are for two domestic shocks (productivity
and housing preference) and for two foreign shocks (foreign demand and foreign interest rate).
Table 2 presents the variance decompositions for key variables for the case without FDI
and the case with FDI (the latter in parentheses). The variables are GDP, consumption, CPI
inflation, domestic housing investment, house price inflation, and policy interest rate.
In Panel A, we compare the standard deviations of these variables, expressed as percentages
of their respective steady states. The effects of FDI, under the simplest form of monetary policy,
are more volatile GDP, consumption, and policy interest rate, and more stable CPI inflation,
housing investment, and house price inflation.
In Panel B, we compare the variance decompositions between these two cases. This panel
reveals the following general observations. First, the contribution of productivity shocks, as
expected, dominates the variance decompositions. Second, overall volatility in the variables
can be attributed, to a large extent, to foreign shocks. This is especially so for GDP, the
policy interest rate, and house price inflation. Third, shocks to the demand factors, namely,
the domestic housing preference and foreign demand, are the most important contributors to
volatility in house price inflation.
A closer comparison of the variance decompositions for the simulations with/without FDI
shows that the presence of foreign investment in domestic housing has an important effect on
domestic housing investment and house price inflation. The importance of the foreign shocks
in explaining domestic housing investments increases from 4.8% to 10.5% for foreign demand.
Correspondingly, the importance of productivity drops from 76.0% to 71.1%. For house price
inflation, the importance of foreign interest rate increases slightly. The variance decompositions
4According to Singapore’s data, around 16% of the residential properties are owned by foreigners. This
proportion translates to 3% of the GDP in our model economy.
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for the other variables appear to be similar and, thus, are barely affected by the presence/absence
of FDI.
To obtain further insights into the differences in the contributions of the shocks, we compare
the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a foreign demand shock and a domestic
housing preference shock. In Fig. 3a, we show the impulse responses to a foreign demand shock
for the cases without/with FDI in the housing market. The former is represented as blue dashed
lines and the latter as red solid lines. The immediate effect of an increase in foreign demand
in the consumption-good sector (blue dashed lines) is the higher volume of exports and hence
the higher profits for the savers who own the firms. Both savers and borrowers consume less
as foreigners consume more. The higher profits from the production sector cause a surge in
housing investments by the savers, which crowds out the borrowers’. Fewer loans are available
as savers invest more. Housing output responds to the aggregate housing demand with an initial
oversupply followed by a contraction. The resultant levels of the real house price inflation are
therefore first below the steady state and then above it.
When FDI is present in the housing market, the differences show up mainly in the housing
sector. As the red solid lines show, the domestic house buyers invest less in housing as foreigners
invest more. The crowding-out effect of the FDI has moderated housing investment from the
savers. The resultant aggregate demand from the savers, the borrowers, and the foreigners is
lower than in the case without FDI. The housing output responds to the aggregate demand with
a decline and gradual movement back to its steady state. Because of the less volatile movements
in the demand and supply in the housing market, the real house price inflation also exhibits
smaller fluctuations. The responses of GDP and CPI inflation do not vary differently across
these two cases.
In contrast to the effects of foreign shocks, the impulse responses for domestic shocks are
not as distinguishable between the cases with/without FDI in the housing market. The impulse
responses are depicted in Fig. 3b. A housing preference shock causes the demand for housing
to increase. The effect is immediate for the borrowers. The savers respond with an initial
dip, followed by higher housing investment. Real house price inflation is higher because of
the increased demand. At the same time, housing output drops as the increase in house price
inflation compensates for the profit from housing development. Comparing the cases without
and with FDI in the housing market, we find the most obvious differences to be in the housing
investments by the savers and the borrowers.
Overall, foreign participation in domestic housing is modelled here as being driven by port-
folio considerations about returns. This implies that foreigners enter the domestic housing
market when prices are high (returns to housing exceed returns to foreign bonds) and exit when
house prices are low (relative returns are not favourable to housing). This helps to smooth
out some of the fluctuations in the domestic housing market, and thus, overall foreign shocks
become less important as sources of fluctuations in housing market dynamics and, by extension,
of fluctuations in overall real activity (GDP) and CPI inflation.
We also examined impulse responses to the productivity and the foreign interest-rate shocks.
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To keep this paper concise, these figures are not presented here, but are available from the
corresponding author on request. The impulses are consistent with the findings given here.
4 Policies and welfare
We have seen how FDI affects the dynamics of the model economy. We now discuss how policies
should be designed to achieve better welfare for a society. The welfare criterion adopted is
widely used in the literature, for example, Faia and Monacelli (2007), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007), and Erceg et al. (2000). Specifically, the welfare of each household type is computed as
the conditional expectation of the lifetime utility at time t:
Vi,t = Ui,t + βiVi,t+1, (42)
where i denotes the household type. It follows that the society’s welfare is calculated as the
weighted average of the welfare of the two types of household:
Ṽt ≡ (1− βs)Vs,t + (1− βb)Vb,t. (43)
Higher values of the welfare measures correspond to improvements in welfare. The values
of the welfare measures are obtained as the unconditional means of Vs,t, Vb,t, and Ṽt. In the
simulations, the DSGE model is solved at the second order.
Given the form of the utility function, the difference in welfare between a base case and under
an alternative policy rule can also be presented as the change in consumption units required for
households under the baseline policy to achieve the same level of welfare under the alternative





V 1i − V 0i
)]
− 1, (44)
where V 1i is the lifetime utility of household type i under the alternative policy, and V
0
i is the
lifetime utility under the baseline policy. Accordingly, the consumption-equivalent welfare effect
for the society is calculated as
exp
[(
Ṽ 1 − Ṽ 0
)]
− 1. (45)
In obtaining the optimal policy regimes, we assume that the policy maker’s objective is
to achieve the highest level of welfare, Ṽ , by adopting a reaction function that links a policy
instrument to changes in economic conditions. We consider a number of policy options that
are combinations of simple rules describing the responses of policy instruments. The policy
instruments involve both monetary and fiscal tools, namely, the interest rate, the LTV ratio
cap, and the stamp duty. The policy interest rate responds to changing economic conditions
as reflected in GDP growth, CPI inflation, and optionally, real house price inflation. The LTV
ratio cap may be fixed or time-varying in response to domestic loans or real house price inflation.
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Similarly, the stamp duty may be fixed or time-varying in response to real house price inflation.
Additionally, the stamp duty may be differentiated according to the nationality of the buyers,
allowing greater flexibility in enhancing welfare.
We compute the welfare effects under alternative rules and present the consumption-equivalent
welfare effects from the various alternative rules. In the following simulations, the baseline case
is the one with the ad hoc Taylor rule and no FDI in the domestic housing market described in
section 3. The coefficients of the optimal policy rules and their respective welfare outcomes are
summarised in Table 3. Numbers in parentheses correspond to the case with FDI.
4.1 Welfare effects of FDI
Before examining optimal policy regimes, we first look at the welfare effects of having FDI under
the ad hoc regime. The first column in Table 3 provides the coefficients in the ad hoc regime
and the welfare effect with respect to the baseline case. As per the design of our experiment,
the only source of the differences in welfare is the change in the parameter value of θ∗h. At the
society level, welfare improves. This is because FDI increases the income flows to the domestic
economy, and hence, aggregate consumption is likely to be higher when compared with the case
without FDI.
However, we also note that this is not a Pareto improvement in welfare. Although society’s
welfare improves, it is at the expense of the savers. The welfare of savers is negatively affected,
but overall, society’s welfare is dominated by the positive effect on the welfare of borrowers.
As will be discussed later in section 5, the welfare losses incurred by savers, due to FDI, are
associated with more volatile interest returns, causing increased uncertainty in the income of
savers.
4.2 Alternative optimal policy rules
All rules in the remaining columns in Table 3 are optimal policy rules. For each policy option,
we search over commonly accepted ranges for parameters governing the responses of the policy
instruments, to identify the optimal set of values that will deliver the highest welfare. As in
column 1, the welfare effects are with respect to the baseline scenario (ad hoc policy rule and
no FDI).5
We discuss five sets of optimal policies. The first is the optimised Taylor rule regime (TR).
The second is an extension of TR to include consideration of house price inflation (augmented
TR, or ATR). The third alternative is to complement TR with a time-varying LTV ratio cap
that responds to selected variables (the TR+LTV policy regime). The fourth alternative is
the addition of a fiscal rule, or a time-varying stamp duty, to the TR (the TR+FR policy
regime). The final alternative scenario is the consideration of a policy setting with all policy
instruments in effect (TR+LTV+FR). Note that the three alternatives that involve the use of
5For the optimal Taylor rule regime, the ranges of parameters over which our grid search is conducted are
[1, 10] and [0, 10] for φR,π and φR,g, respectively, and [0, 0.9] for the smoothing parameter ρR. The grid step
for each parameter is 0.1. The set of parameters corresponding to the highest mean value of Ṽ then forms the
optimal policy rule.
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macro-prudential tools (LTV and/or FR) are alternatives to the ATR case (which targets house
price inflation directly).
All alternative policy options considered are also linear additions to TR. Since TR is always
in operation alongside the alternative policy specifications, we hold the optimised coefficients in
Eq. (39) unchanged when searching for the additional optimal policy coefficients and smoothing
parameters introduced in the alternative policies. This approach allows us to analyse the change
in effects between TR and the alternative policies as any changes in economic dynamics or
welfare reflect the additional responses introduced in the alternative policy rules.6 Accordingly,
should the alternative specifications not deliver better welfare than TR, the coefficients in the
alternative specifications remain at 0.
In what follows, we assess the welfare effects of the optimal regimes in two ways. First, we
analyse the change in welfare due to an inflow of FDI into domestic housing. This is done by
comparing, under the same policy regime, the cases without and with FDI. Second, we analyse
the welfare effects relative to the TR regime by comparing the cases with/without FDI under
each regime with the same case under TR (see Fig. 4 for a visual comparison).
4.2.1 Interest-rate regimes
As seen from columns 2 and 3 in Table 3, the TR regime features larger response to CPI inflation,
smaller response to GDP , and slightly higher smoothing than in the ad hoc policy regime case.
The coefficients for the with/without FDI are very similar. Taking into account the smoothing
coefficient, TR in both cases features active responses to CPI inflation (φR,π > 1).
The transition from the ad hoc regime to the TR policy regime shows substantial welfare
improvement. This is, however, not a Pareto improvement, because savers experience lower
welfare while borrowers experience higher welfare. This is because of the more active responses
to CPI inflation under the optimised TR regime, which lead to greater movements in the interest
rate and, hence, greater volatility in the income savers receive from their domestic lending. The
situation is, moreover, worse in the presence of FDI. Despite the improvement in overall social
welfare, the welfare of savers falls in the case without FDI (compare this (column 2) with the
case with FDI (column 3)).
The first alternative rule we consider is whether the interest-rate rule should also include
targeting conditions in the housing market. We do this by evaluating the welfare implications
of an interest-rate rule that includes reactions to changes in real house price inflation. We call
this ATR (augmented Taylor rule) because it is simply an extension of the conventional Taylor











)φR,g ( P rh,t
P rh,t−1
)φR,πh1−ρR , (46)
6Less computing power is also needed in finding the optimal parameters. Time needed for the grid search
increases exponentially with the number of parameters. Searching among subsets of the parameters helps to
reduce computing time.
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where P rh,t denotes the relative (real) price of housing to that of consumption goods. When
φR,πh = 0, ATR collapses to the TR case. Where φR,πh > 0, the interest rate moves counter-
cyclically with real house price inflation. It is designed to curb housing investment by increasing
the cost of borrowing as real house inflation accelerates.7 As columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 show,
the ATR features passive responses to real house price inflation after taking into account the
smoothing parameter.
There are two potential side-effects associated with this policy regime. First, the additional
target introduces additional uncertainty to the interest income of the savers. Second, as is
evident from the uncovered interest-rate parity relationship, there will be greater exchange-
rate uncertainty, which in turn creates greater uncertainty in the profits of firms from exports.
Savers are thus likely to be at a disadvantage under this regime. From columns 4 and 5 in
Table 3, despite higher welfare to society, when compared with TR, the welfare of savers is
lower regardless of the absence/presence of FDI in the domestic housing market.
Comparing across the cases with and without FDI, we find similar welfare implications for
savers, borrowers, and society. Specifically, savers suffer from lower welfare, while borrowers
gain in welfare, when there is FDI in the domestic housing market. The overall aggregate effect
of FDI on society is slightly higher.
We show in Fig. 4a the welfare effect of ATR as the response of interest rate to real house
price inflation increases from 0 to 5 in the case with FDI. Note that when φR,πh = 0, the regime
is the same as TR, and hence, no welfare effect is observed. These plots show that the savers’
welfare deteriorates in the positive range of φR,πh , while the borrowers’ welfare becomes worse
at values greater than 5. Society gains in welfare when φR,φh < 2.3.
Rather than target house price inflation, we next investigate alternative instruments of
macro-prudential policies. Specifically, we consider the welfare outcomes from implementing a
TR interest-rate regime in conjunction with the use of other time-varying instruments such as
the macro-prudential tool, the LTV ratio, and/or the fiscal tool of stamp duties.
4.2.2 Dynamic LTV ratio cap
We consider a dynamic LTV ratio cap (TR+LTV), which varies in a counter-cyclical manner














. The LTV ratio cap, ιt, may be fixed or time-varying, depending on
the coefficient φι,x. When φι,x = 0, the LTV ratio cap is fixed at ῑ as in Table 1. In this
scenario, when real house price inflation increases or domestic loans expand, loans available to
the borrowers also increase, potentially posing higher systemic risk to the economy. In contrast,
when φι,x > 0, the time-varying LTV ratio cap changes — falls with increases in real house
7After coefficients in the TR are determined, the additional coefficient, φR,πh , in ATR is found by searching
over the range [0, 5], also in steps of 0.1.
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price inflation or expansion of domestic loans — so the growth in loans available to borrowers
is moderated. Following Mendicino and Punzi (2014), we assume that the LTV ratio cap may
respond to only one variable at a time. The time-varying feature in the LTV ratio cap is
expected to lead to smoother payment schedules for borrowers, although it also implies less
interest income for savers.
The optimal coefficients for TR+LTV are presented in columns 6 to 9 in Table 3. We
present the optimal responses of the LTV ratio cap to real house price inflation in columns 6
and 8, and the optimal responses to growth in domestic loans in columns 7 and 9. Although the
optimal LTV ratio cap responds to real house price inflation or domestic loans in a fairly active
manner, the autoregressive coefficient of 0.9 helps to smooth the changes, resulting in less than
proportionate responses. The responses in the case without FDI (columns 6 and 7) are slightly
larger than, but comparable with, those in the case with FDI (columns 8 and 9).
In contrast to the ATR regime discussed earlier, FDI under a TR+LTV policy regime does
not lead to a clear improvement in the overall welfare of society. Comparing columns 6 and
8 (when the LTV ratio cap is set to respond to house price inflation), we see that the welfare
of borrowers remains about the same, but the welfare of savers is lower. The increase in the
volatility of domestic housing demand associated with the introduction of FDI has not been
sufficiently moderated by the LTV ratio cap rule. Hence, the interest income of savers is affected
negatively by greater uncertainty in the provision of loans, which translates into a deterioration
in the welfare of savers. When the LTV ratio cap is set to respond to the growth in home loans,
there is a marginal improvement in welfare when FDI is present.
We show in Fig. 4b the welfare effects relative to TR in the case with FDI for a range of
reaction coefficients. The red solid lines are for the case when the LTV ratio cap responds
to real house price inflation; the blue dashed lines are for the case when the LTV ratio cap
responds to domestic loan growth. It is clear that an LTV ratio cap responding to real house
price inflation delivers higher social welfare than one responding to domestic loan growth, but,
similar to ATR, the welfare of savers is lower compared to TR in the positive range of φι,πh .
Despite the lower social welfare gain shown by the blue dashed lines, it is interesting to find
that the savers may gain from an LTV ratio cap responding to domestic loan growth at a value
of φι,b that is large enough. It is even possible to achieve a small Pareto improvement when φι,b
is between 4 and 6. However, because of the marginal improvement in welfare, we shall focus
our discussion on the TR+LTV regime that responds to real house price inflation only.
4.2.3 Dynamic fiscal rules
The second time-varying instrument we investigate, together with a Taylor rule, is a fiscal rule
(FR), or as it is more commonly known, stamp duties on housing transactions. It is important
to note that this fiscal instrument has symmetric effects — it can be a tax or a subsidy imposed
on participants in the market. Taxes increase transaction costs and curb housing demand,
while subsidies offset changes in house price, delivering smoother transaction price movements
(especially useful to support affordable housing during periods of house price hikes).
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In practice, policy makers tend to be sensitive to the nationality of the house buyers and
will implement discriminatory fiscal measures. In other words, domestic and foreign buyers will




















where τ and τ∗ correspond to fiscal rules imposed on the local and the foreign buyers, respec-
tively. They can be interpreted as stamp duties if the values are greater than unity and subsidies
if the values are less than unity. Similar to the LTV ratio cap, the stamp duty or subsidy can be
fixed or time-varying, depending on the values of the coefficients φτ,πh and φ
∗
τ,πh
. In the case of
a dynamic stamp duty (subsidy) rule, the buyers are taxed (subsidised) more when real house
price is higher.
Coefficients for the TR+FR policy regime are presented in columns 10 to 12 in Table 3.
In the case without FDI, no foreign buyers can participate in the domestic housing market.
Hence, the TR+FR regime does not include the coefficient φ∗τ,π. When FDI is present in
domestic housing, policy makers have the option to tax foreign buyers (to include or to exclude
Eq. (49) alongside Eq. (48)).
Our experiment here is to identify the welfare effects of a stamp duty on foreign buyers.
For the case with FDI, we run a simulation assuming Eq. (49) is not in action (column 11) and
compare it with a simulation when Eq. (49) is implemented.
The optimal rules in the TR+FR regime are interpreted as stamp duties (instead of subsidies,
given the positive coefficients). These rules indicate active and persistent responses of the
stamp duty to real house price inflation. As such, following an increase in real house price
inflation, there is a redistribution of wealth from house buyers back to patient and impatient
households. The redistribution of income may boost domestic consumption as well as mitigate
the distortionary impact of taxes on consumption and investment decisions.
The fact that domestic and foreign buyers can be subject to different stamp duties implies
greater flexibility in pursuing policies to enhance social welfare. Without imposing a stamp duty
on foreign buyers, the welfare effect of FDI under TR+FR is similar to TR+LTV. Borrowers
gain while savers lose, leading to an overall loss in social welfare (columns 10 and 11). However,
if we compare the welfare effects in columns 11 and 12, we can see that the welfare of society
is improved when there is an additional stamp duty rule on foreign buyers. The welfare loss to
savers is also smaller when compared with the case without FDI. TR+FR with a stamp duty
on foreign buyers enhances the income-redistributing effect at the expense of foreign buyers,
mitigating the welfare loss to savers.
It is important to note that the stamp duty rules for local residents and for foreigners need
to work together to achieve the best welfare outcome. We show the welfare effect of TR+FR
relative to TR in Fig. 4c. Each stamp duty rule may improve social welfare when working
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independently, but will lead to steep welfare loss for savers, especially when the stamp duty
is imposed on only local residents. The loss-mitigating effect from the foreigners’ stamp duty
kicks in at only the moderate range of φτ,πh . As such, both stamp duty rules are needed to
achieve the highest social welfare or the least welfare loss to savers. Nevertheless, the savers’




4.2.4 A combined monetary–fiscal strategy
The final policy regime investigated is one with a Taylor rule, a dynamic LTV ratio cap, and a
fiscal rule (TR+LTV+FR). The optimal policy parameters are not restricted, and we find that
this regime delivers a better welfare outcome that all the other options discussed. It turns out
that, in the case without FDI, TR+LTV+FR produces outcomes similar to the TR+LTV case,
implying that the FR component is redundant. However, in the case with FDI, a coordinated
use of these three policy instruments yields the best welfare (column 13 in Table 3) (but only
slightly better than under TR+FR). Similarly, borrowers gain and savers lose as compared with
TR, but the redistribution of stamp duties collected partially mitigates the loss to savers.
4.2.5 Discussion
The simulations were designed to consider the effects of five policy regimes on welfare. The
base case is the traditional Taylor rule (TR), where the interest rate is formulated to maintain
stability in goods price inflation. The first point to note is that allowing the interest rate to
also react to changes in real house price inflation is not necessarily better at improving welfare
than the adoption of alternative macro-prudential tools (such as the LTV ratio cap and stamp
duties).
Second, although ATR, TR+LTV, TR+FR, and TR+LTV+FR all deliver higher social
welfare than TR, the welfare of savers falls in all scenarios. This is because the additional
target or policy instruments introduce greater uncertainty in the interest income of savers. This
effect is exacerbated when the housing market is open to FDI.
Third, our welfare comparison across the policy regimes shows that TR+LTV delivers the
best welfare outcome under the condition that FDI in the domestic housing market is not
allowed. However, this may not be a realistic scenario for global cities in small open economies.
We find instead that coordination between monetary and fiscal rules — the TR+LTV+FR
regime — delivers the next best welfare outcome for society.
Rather than ban FDI altogether, the imposition of stamp duties on foreign investment
in domestic housing can serve two purposes. On the one hand, it discourages excessive foreign
demand if the housing market is overheated, and on the other hand, the income generated can be
redistributed to local residents, thereby increasing consumption and investments domestically.
If operated optimally, the TR+FR regime is capable of mitigating the welfare losses of savers
and at the same time maintaining the welfare-improving feature of FDI.
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5 Stabilising effects of policies
To round off the analysis, we present results about the stabilising/de-stabilising effects of FDI
under alternative optimal policy regimes. These effects may differ from those reported in sec-
tion 3, because alternative policy reaction functions can change the nature of responses in
housing market conditions. For completeness, the volatility comparisons are presented in two
tables — one to show the effect of FDI and another to show the effect of the policy regime.
We list in Table 4 the changes in standard deviations, allowing for FDI in domestic housing
under different optimal policy regimes. The values presented are ratios of standard deviations,
calculated relative to the base case without FDI, in each policy regime. A value greater than
unity indicates greater volatility, and vice versa.
In Table 5, we present the standard deviations under respective regimes relative to the TR
regime. In this comparison, we also distinguish between the case without and with FDI (the
latter in parentheses). If the ratio of standard deviations is greater than unity, it indicates
larger volatility relative to the TR case, and vice versa.
Note first the higher volatility in policy interest rates across all regimes. This reflects either
the introduction of the additional house price inflation target or the more variable demand and
supply of loans.
The lower volatility in house price inflation is also notable.8 This result reflects the portfolio
balancing behaviour of foreign buyers as FDI in domestic housing equalises the expected return
from housing investment with the return on a riskless foreign asset. This effect will moderate
the volatility of house price inflation, as long as international returns remain stable.
In contrast to the more stable house price inflation, domestic housing investments appear to
be more volatile under the multi-instrument regimes. Note that under the fiscal rules (TR+FR
and TR+LTV+FR), the de-stabilising effect of FDI is most obvious. This is jointly due to the
crowding-out of domestic housing investments by FDI and the stamp duty that directly distorts
households’ consumption and investment decisions.
The effects of FDI on the other macroeconomic variables are mixed. In general, FDI leads
to more volatile aggregate consumption and CPI inflation. Volatility in GDP is more stable
under TR+FR and TR+LTV+FR and is almost unaffected under TR, ATR, and TR+LTV.
When FDI is not present in domestic housing, the alternative regimes (relative to TR), in
general, deliver more stable macroeconomic variables. GDP, housing investments, and house
price inflation are all more stable under TR+FR. Consumption is most stable under ATR. CPI
inflation and policy interest rate are most stable under TR+LTV. We also see a correspondence
between the welfare-based optimal policy and the stabilisation objective of the policy makers.
When FDI is present in domestic housing, the stabilisation effects are slightly different. This
difference arises from the volatility of housing investments, which becomes higher than in the
TR case under the alternative regimes: ATR, TR+LTV, TR+FR, and TR+LTV+FR. The
volatility in housing investment is highest in TR+LTV+FR. However, house price inflation is
best stabilised with TR+FR and TR+LTV+FR. This result shows that the welfare maximisa-
8Lower volatility in house price inflation was also evident in section 3.
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tion objective and the stabilisation of house price inflation are also consistent in the case when
FDI is present in domestic housing.
We plot in Fig. 5 the impulse responses to foreign demand shock and domestic housing
preference shock in the case with FDI. It appears that FDI leads to greater crowding-out effects
in domestic housing investments, but smaller drops in consumption under the FR regimes with
foreign demand shock (Fig. 5a). Under a domestic housing preference shock, the FR regimes
help to curb the demand from FDI, to prevent overheating of the domestic housing market
(Fig. 5b).
In sum, FDI in domestic housing is not always de-stabilising. The de-stabilising effects are
more likely with the macroeconomic variables such as consumption, CPI inflation, and interest
rate, rather than with variables in the housing sector such as house price inflation. Furthermore,
the effects are regime-dependent. Regimes involving coordination between monetary and fiscal
instruments are more likely to be associated with larger stabilising or de-stabilising effects of
FDI. Among the five regimes, the stabilising effect of FDI on house price inflation is most
prominent under the TR+LTV+FR policy regime.
6 Conclusion
Housing has become more tradable with the ease of international fund transfers and travelling.
In global cities where population density is high, housing is seen as an attractive investment
vehicle for buyers around the world. Policy makers thus face the challenge of balancing the
benefits and costs of FDI in the housing sector. In this paper, we examine the implications of a
“tradable” housing sector for the design of macro-prudential policies in small open economies.
We propose a model that allows for foreign investment in domestic housing. The model
is simulated to yield insights about the importance of FDI in housing as well as to provide
some understanding about the welfare and volatility implications of various policy regimes.
The policy regimes examined include the adoption of a Taylor rule in conjunction with the
implementation of time-varying LTV ratio caps and stamp duty rules on housing transactions
by foreigners. We also considered the adoption of a Taylor rule that includes reacting to house
price inflation.
Our findings are as follows. First, FDI in domestic housing is, in general, welfare-improving
and does not de-stabilise house price inflation. The former result is due to the additional income
that foreign entities bring to the economy, analogous to exports purchased; the latter result is
due to the portfolio balancing behaviour of the foreign investors. Second, coordination in the
use of instruments such as the interest rate and other time-varying instruments (the LTV ratio
cap and stamp duty rules) enhances the welfare of the economy. Finally, FDI and optimal
policy regimes, in general, make savers worse off, but the losses can be mitigated by an active
stamp duty rule on foreign buyers. This is because of the redistribution of wealth from foreign
buyers to the domestic residents, which increases consumption and investment domestically.
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Figure 1: Surcharges on foreign buyers versus annualised growth rates of real house prices. The
annualised growth rates are computed as the average of the current and past three observations
of annualised real house price growth rates. Quarterly data are used for Singapore (SIN), Sydney
(SYD), Melbourne (MEL), Brisbane (BNE), and London (LON), monthly data for Hong Kong
































































































Figure 2: Flows of funds. Foreign household participation in the domestic housing market is
governed by θ∗h. Exogenous shocks in the model are foreign demand Y
∗, foreign interest rate R∗,
domestic housing preference shock zh to both saver and borrower, and domestic productivity
shock A to both the goods-producing firm and the housing developer. The policy instruments
available are the interest rate R, LTV ratio ι, and fiscal tools τ and τ∗.
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(a) Foreign demand shock.












































































(b) Housing preference shock.
Figure 3: Impulse responses with and without FDI in domestic housing (b, borrowers; s, savers).
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(a) Welfare effect of interest-rate response to πh.













































































































































































































































(c) Welfare effect of stamp duty response to house price inflation.
Figure 4: Welfare effects of response coefficients.
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(a) Foreign demand shock.



















































(b) Housing preference shock.
Figure 5: Impulse responses under optimal regimes. The optimal coefficients are from Table 3.
TR+LTV corresponds to column 8. TR+FR corresponds to column 12.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameter values.
Parameter Value Description
βs 0.993 Discount factor (s)
κs 0.500 Housing preference (s)
ηs 0.500 Inverse Frisch (s)
βb 0.970 Discount factor (b)
κb 0.500 Housing preference (b)
ηb 0.500 Inverse Frisch (b)
δ 0.010 Housing depreciation
ϕ 0.001 Coefficient of risk premium
µc 0.300 Proportion of capital input in goods production
µh 0.300 Proportion of land input in housing development
θ∗h 0.500 Foreign housing demand elasticity
θ∗c 3.000 Foreign goods demand elasticity
% 0.500 Habit formation
γh 8.000 Housing adjustment cost
ξ 0.500 Price stickiness
ρAc 0.900 Autoregressive coefficient of productivity
ρzh 0.800 Autoregressive coefficient of housing preference
ρ∗π 0.800 Autoregressive coefficient of foreign inflation
ρ∗R 0.800 Autoregressive coefficient of foreign interest rate
ρ∗c 0.800 Autoregressive coefficient of exports
ρR 0.500 Smoothing parameter of stamp duty for interest rate
φR,g 0.500 Response of interest rate to GDP growth
φR,π 1.500 Response of interest rate to goods price inflation
Table 2: Volatility and variance decompositions with and without FDI in housing.
A. Volatility B. Variance decompositions
(% of s.s.) Productivity Housing preference Foreign interest rate Foreign demand
GDP 1.684 (1.699 ) 59.6 (59.9) 4.4 (4.2) 8.9 (8.9) 27.1 (27.1)
Consumption 1.115 (1.132 ) 75.5 (76.0) 1.9 (1.7) 9.6 (9.4) 13.0 (12.9)
CPI inflation 0.356 (0.344 ) 55.6 (53.5) 14.3 (14.0) 6.6 (7.8) 23.6 (24.7)
Domestic housing investment 2.699 (2.180 ) 76.0 (71.1) 16.0 (15.5) 3.1 (2.9) 4.8 (10.5)
House price inflation 0.440 (0.349 ) 28.2 (25.0) 34.4 (34.0) 9.2 (13.6) 28.2 (27.4)
Policy interest rate 0.326 (0.326 ) 7.1 (5.6) 16.9 (15.4) 8.5 (8.3) 67.6 (70.7)
Notes: Simulations are conducted under the ad hoc policy regime with ρR = 0.5, φR,π = 1.5, and φR,g = 0.5; θ
∗
h is set to 0 for the case
without FDI and 0.5 for the case with FDI. Panel A summarises the standard deviations as percentages of steady states (s.s.). Variance































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Changes in volatility due to FDI
TR ATR TR+LTV TR+FR TR+LTV+FR
GDP 1.004 1.005 1.002 0.991 0.982
Consumption 1.042 1.020 1.041 1.018 1.031
CPI inflation 1.115 1.181 1.193 1.207 1.313
Domestic housing investment 0.939 0.978 0.986 1.333 1.262
House price inflation 0.854 0.914 0.942 0.581 0.319
Policy interest rate 1.182 1.150 1.224 1.250 1.256
Notes: Values indicate standard deviations relative to the case without FDI under the re-
spective regimes. Values greater than unity refer to higher standard deviations than without
FDI. The lowest standard deviation for each variable is shown in blue, while the highest is
in red. Where there is more than one possible specification under the same regime, the fol-
lowing columns from Table 3 are used to compute the relative standard deviations: columns
6 and 8 for TR+LTV and columns 10 and 12 for TR+FR; for TR+LTV+FR, columns 6
and 13 are used.
Table 5: Changes in volatility due to regime shifts.
ATR TR+LTV TR+FR TR+LTV+FR
(4) (5) (6) (8) (10) (12) (13)
GDP 0.996 (0.997 ) 0.997 (0.995 ) 0.986 (0.973 ) (0.975 )
Consumption 0.969 (0.948 ) 0.994 (0.993 ) 1.007 (0.983 ) (0.983 )
CPI inflation 0.921 (0.975 ) 0.834 (0.893 ) 0.923 (0.999 ) (0.983 )
Domestic housing investment 1.003 (1.044 ) 0.949 (0.997 ) 0.896 (1.271 ) (1.276 )
House price inflation 0.629 (0.673 ) 0.856 (0.944 ) 0.351 (0.239 ) (0.320 )
Policy interest rate 0.986 (0.959 ) 0.919 (0.951 ) 0.927 (0.980 ) (0.975 )
Notes: Values indicate standard deviations relative to TR for cases without and with FDI (the latter in parentheses). Val-
ues greater than unity refer to higher standard deviations than TR. The lowest standard deviations for each variable are
shown in blue, while the highest are in red. Where there is more than one possible specification under the same regime, the
following columns from Table 3 are used to compute the relative standard deviations: columns 6 and 8 for TR+LTV and
columns 10 and 12 for TR+FR.
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